Philosophical Implications: The Slippery Slope of Indifference to Truth

The philosophical danger of this choice, then, is that it may encourage both AI and human users to value language based on utility or plausibility rather than a commitment to accuracy. Over time, this could subtly erode the importance of truth in communication. Just as Frankfurt warns that bullshit can undermine society’s commitment to truth, high-temperature LLM outputs could contribute to a similar effect, normalising statements that “sound right” but lack factual grounding.

If truth becomes secondary in human-AI communication, the long-term result may be a culture that gradually prioritises convenient, plausible discourse over rigorous, truth-oriented thinking. This shift can have significant impacts not just on individual understanding but on collective trust in information and discourse.

In essence, Option A allows LLMs to function as potential bullshitters, producing text that fits the moment without concern for reality. And if users adopt this model of language, they too might increasingly embody the role of the bullshitter, valuing the “feel” of truth without the accountability of actually verifying it.